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Abstract
It is quite well-known from Kurt Gödel’s (1931) ground-breaking result
on the Incompleteness Theorem that rudimentary relations (i.e., those de-
finable by bounded formulae) are primitive recursive, and that primitive
recursive functions are representable in sufficiently strong arithmetical the-
ories. It is also known, though perhaps not as well-known as the former
one, that some primitive recursive relations (and functions) are not rudi-
mentary. We present a simple and elementary proof of this fact in the first
part of this paper. In the second part, we review some possible notions
of representability of functions studied in the literature, and give a new
proof of the equivalence of the weak representability with the (strong) rep-
resentability of functions in sufficiently strong arithmetical theories. Our
results shed some new light on the notions of rudimentary, primitive re-
cursive, and representable functions and relations, and clarify, hopefully,
some misunderstandings and confusing errors in the literature.
2010 AMS Subject Classification: 03F40 · 03D20 · 03F30.
Keywords: arithmetical theory · bounded formula · the incompleteness
theorem · primitive recursive functions / relations · rudimentary relations ·
representability.
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1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Primitive recursive functions are what were called “rekursiv” by Kurt
Gödel in his seminal 1931 paper [6, 7] where he proved the celebrated
incompleteness theorem. The main features of the primitive recursive
functions used by Göde were the following:
1. They are computable (i.e., for each primitive recursive function there
exists an algorithm that computes it). However, we now know that
they do not make up the whole (intuitively) computable functions
(from tuples of natural numbers to natural numbers, Nk → N). So,
“rekursiv” functions are now called “primitive recursive” functions,
which are a part of recursive functions that, by Church’s Thesis, are
believed to constitute the whole computable functions.
2. They are representable in (sufficiently expressive and sufficiently
strong) formal arithmetical theories. It is now known that, more
generally, (only) recursive functions are representable in recursively
enumerable, sufficiently strong and sufficiently expressive theories
(see Section 3 below).
3. Theories whose set of axioms are primitive recursive and extend a
base theory (such as Robinson’s Arithmetic Q), are incomplete. It
was later found out that this holds more generally for recursively
enumerable extensions ofQ; also by Craig’s Trick every such theory
is equivalent with another theory whose set of axioms is rudimentary
(i.e., definable by a bounded formula).
Even though one can set up the whole theory of computable functions (aka
recursion theory) and the incompleteness theorems without introducing the
notion of primitive recursive functions (and relations), the theory of prim-
itive recursive functions is a main topic in the literature on recursive func-
tion theory and the incompleteness theorems (see [15]). For the sake of
completeness we review some basic notions of this theory.
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DEFINITION 1.1 (Primitive Recursive Functions)
The class of primitive recursive (PR) functions is the smallest class that
contains the initial functions
(i) the constant zero function ζ : N→ N, ζ(x)=0,
(ii) the successor function σ : N→ N, σ(x)=x+1, and
(iii) the projection functions πni : N
n → N, πni (x1, · · · , xn)=xi, for
any n > 1 and any i 6 n;
and is closed under
(I) the composition of functions, i.e., contains the function h : Nn → N
if it already contains the functions g1, · · · , gm : Nn → N and f : Nm → N,
where h(x1, · · · , xn)=f
(
g1(x1, . . . , xn), · · · , gm(x1, · · · , xn)
)
, and
(II) the primitive recursion, i.e., contains the function h : Nn+1 → N
if it already contains the functions f : Nn → N and g : Nn+2 → N, where
h : Nn+1 → N is inductively defined by

h(x1, · · · , xn, 0)=f(x1, · · · , xn),
h(x1, · · · , xn, x+1)=g
(
h(x1, · · · , xn, x), x1, · · · , xn, x
)
.
✧
It can be easily shown that the addition and multiplication functions
(+: N2 → N, (x, y) 7→ x+y and × : N2 → N, (x, y) 7→ x ·y) and the
following sign functions are primitive recursive:
ψ(x) =


0 if x=0,
1 if x 6=0,
and ψ(x) =


1 if x=0,
0 if x 6=0.
DEFINITION 1.2 (Primitive Recursive Relations)
The characteristic function of a relation R ⊆ Nn is χR : N
n → {0, 1},
χR(x1, · · · , xn) =


1 if (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R,
0 if (x1, · · · , xn) 6∈ R.
A relation is called primitive recursive (PR) relation, if its characteristic
function is primitive recursive. ✧
For example, the equality (=) and inequality (6) can be shown to be
PR relations. The following identities show that the class of PR relations is
closed under Boolean operations and bounded quantifications:
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χR∩S=χR · χS; χR∁ =ψ(χR); χR∪S=ψ(χR+χS);


χ∀x6αR(z,x)(z, 0)=χR(z, 0),
χ∀x6αR(z,x)(z, α+1)=χ∀x6αR(z,x)(z, α) · χR(z, α+1);

χ∃x6αR(z,x)(z, 0)=χR(z, 0),
χ∃x6αR(z,x)(z, α+1)=ψ
(
χ∀x6αP (z,x)(z, α)+χP (z, α+1)
)
.
DEFINITION 1.3 (Rudimentary Relations)
A formula in the language of arithmetic 〈0, 1,+, ·,6〉 is called bounded, if
it has been constructed from atomic formulas (of the form t=s or t6s for
terms s, t) by means of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and
bounded quantifications (of the form ∀x6 t or ∃x6 t where the formula
∀x 6 t A(x, t) reads as ∀x
[
x6 t → A(x, t)
]
and ∃x 6 t A(x, t) reads as
∃x
[
x6 t ∧ A(x, t)
]
).
The class of bounded formulas is denoted by∆0.
A relation R ⊆ Nn is called rudimentary or bounded definable, or simply
∆0, if it can be defined by a ∆0-formula, i.e., there exists a ∆0-formula
ϕ(x1, · · · , xn) such that R = {(x1, · · · , xn) | N |= ϕ(x1, · · · , xn)}. ✧
We have already noticed that all∆0 relations are PR; see e.g. [3, 9, 20]. The
question as to whether the converse holds, i.e., whether every PR relation
is ∆0, has been mentioned in very few places. Unfortunately, as will be
indicated, some of them are wrong or misleading:
(1) On page 315 of [9] we read: “A relation is primitive recursive if
and only if it is definable by a ∆0 formula. We presently prove one
direction of this fact. The other direction shall become apparent after
Section 8.3 of the next chapter and is left as Exercise 8.6.”
This leaves the reader wondering what (theorems or techniques)
will be provided in Chapter 8 (the incompleteness theorems) of the
book [9] that will enable the reader to show that every PR relation is
rudimentary, i.e., ∆0 definable. The fact of the matter is that, as will
be seen below, it is not true that every PR relation is ∆0.
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(2) On page 239 of [20] we read as Remark 1, “Induction on the ∆0-
formulas readily shows that all ∆0-predicates are p.r. The converse
does not hold; an example is the graph of the very rapidly grow-
ing hyperexponentiation, recursively defined by hex(a, 0) = 1 and
hex(a, Sb)=ahex(a,b).”
Graph of a function f : X → Y is, by definition, the relation
Γf ={(x, y) ∈ X×Y | y=f(x)}.
Let us note that for a PR function f its graph Γf is a PR relation, since
χΓf (a, b) =χ=(f(a), b). Now, since hex is a PR function, its graph
is a PR relation. But the claim that this relation is not ∆0 has not
been proved in [20]. In fact, it has been shown in [1] (see also [5])
that this is not true: the graph of hex is actually ∆0.
(3) We read in the Abstract of [5], “The question of whether a given
primitive recursive relation is rudimentary is in some cases difficult
and related to several well-known open questions in theoretical com-
puter science”. Also, on page 130 of [5] we read, “However, it is dif-
ficult to exhibit a natural arithmetical relation which can be proved
not to be rudimentary” and that “This paper is an attempt to system-
ize the use of these tools for proving that various primitive recursive
relations are rudimentary”. Later, on page 132 we read, “Hence,
the main way of exhibiting a primitive recursive relation which is
not rudimentary is to choose it in C3∗ \ C
2
∗. Although it is true that
infinitely many relations exist, we know no natural example”.
Here, by “natural” the authors mean a relation (⊆ Nk) that the
number-theorists use and work with.
(4) On page 85 of [3] after proving that “Every ∆0 relation is primi-
tive recursive” as a Lemma, we read, “Remark: The converse of
the above lemma is false, as can be shown by a diagonal argument.
For those familiar with complexity theory, we can clarify things as
follows. As noted in the Side Remark above, all ∆0 relations can
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be recognized in linear space on a Turing machine. On the other
hand, it follows from the Ritchie-Cobham Theorem that all relations
recognizable in space bounded by a primitive recursive function of
the input length are primitive recursive. In particular, space O(n2)
relations are primitive recursive, and a straightforward diagonal ar-
gument shows that there are relations recognizable in n2 space which
are not recognizable in linear space, and hence are not∆0 relations.”
The mentioned side-remark (that “All∆0 relations can be recognized
in linear space on a Turing machine, when input numbers are repre-
sented in binary notation”) has not been proved in [3].
So, there should exist some PR relation that is not ∆0. Its existence
can be shown by a diagonal argument as in item (4) above, or by some
complexity-theoretic examples1: any relation computable in exponential
time but not in polynomial time, is a PR relation that is not∆0. In Section 2
we will show that a specific PR relation is not ∆0. This relation may not
look natural for number-theorists but is sufficiently natural for logicians.
In the second part, Section 3, we will study some possible notions of
representability of functions and relations in arithmetical theories and will
compare their strength with each other; we will provide a new proof for
an old theorem which appears in a very few places with a lengthy and
tedious proof. The theorem says that every weakly representable function
is (strongly) representable; this is usually proved by showing that (a) every
weakly representable function is recursive, and (b) every recursive function
is (strongly) representable. Our proof is direct and more elementary.
2 Rudimentarity vs. Primitive Recursivity
Let us fix the language of arithmetic as e.g. 〈0, 1,+, ·,6〉 and let us be
given a fixed Gödel coding α 7→ pαq which is primitive recursive (as is
usually presented in the literature).
1Presented by Leszek Aleksander KoÅC´odziejczyk through Zofia Adamowicz; warm
thanks go to them both for this.
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Our example of a PR relation that is not ∆0, uses an idea of Alfred
Tarski; that the truth relation of arithmetical sentences is not arithmetically
definable. Likewise, the truth of ∆0-sentences is not ∆0; but, as will be
shown later, it is PR.
DEFINITION 2.1 (∆0-Satisfaction)
Let Sat∆0 be the set of all the ordered pairs (pθ(ϑ¯)q, a) such that θ(ϑ¯) is a
∆0-formula with the shown free variables, and a is a natural number, such
that N  θ(a¯), i.e, the sentence resulted from substituting a for every free
variable of θ is true (in the standard model of natural numbers). ✧
In the other words, Sat∆0 = {(pθ(ϑ¯)q, a) | N  θ(a¯)}.
THEOREM 2.2 (Non-Rudimentarity of ∆0-Satisfaction)
The relation Sat∆0(x, y) is not definable by any∆0-formula.
Proof:
If a ∆0-formula such as ς(x, y) defines the relation Sat∆0 , then for the
formula θ(x)≡ ¬ς(x, x) (which is ∆0) and number m= pθ(x)q, we have
N  θ(m)↔ ¬Sat∆0(m,m)↔ ¬θ(m), a contradiction! ❑
In the rest of this section, we show that Sat∆0 is a PR relation. This can
already be inferred from the results of [12]; see also [2, Definition 4.1.3
and Lemma 4.1.4] and [17, Theorem 2] and [8, Corollary 5.5]. All of them
use advanced arguments that cannot be mentioned in more elementary texts
like [3, 9, 15, 20]. Our aim here is to provide an elementary proof for non-
primitive recursivity of Sat∆0 in such a way that it can be used, along with
Theorem 2.2, in textbooks for clarifying the status of PR vs. ∆0 relations.
REMARK 2.3 (On Gödel Coding)
We can assume that the set of the Gödel codes of the variables is defin-
able by a ∆0-formula; for example we can keep even numbers 2, 4, 6, · · ·
for coding the variables v0, v1, v2, · · · respectively, and then code the rest
of the language (propositional connectives, quantifiers, parentheses and
function and relation symbols) by odd numbers. As a result of this way
S. SALEHI: Rudimentarity, Primitive Recursivity & Representability 8
of coding, var(x) ≡ ∃y 6 x (y = 2x+2) is a ∆0-formula that defines
the variables. Other syntactical notions of terms, formulas, sentences,
bounded sentences, proofs, etc. can be shown to be PR as usual (see e.g.
[8, 9, 14, 15, 20]). Let p0, p1, p2, · · · be the sequence of all prime numbers
(2, 3, 5, · · · ). Let us code the sequence 〈α0, α1, · · · , αk〉 by the number∏
i6k p
αi+1
i . Let us note that this way, the code of any such sequence will
be non-greater than pkAk , where A is any number greater than all αi’s. Also
let us recall that the functions i 7→ pi and (k, A) 7→ pkAk are both PR (see
e.g. [9, 14, 20]). ✧
DEFINITION 2.4 (Terms, Bounded Formulas, Valuations, etc.)
For a fixed Gödel coding, let the relation
• var(x) hold, when “x is (the Gödel code of) a variable”.
• trm(x) hold, when “x is (the Gödel code of) a term”.
• atm(x) hold, when “x is (the Gödel code of) an atomic formula”.
• fml∆0(x) hold, when “x is (the Gödel code of) a ∆0-formula”.
• val(x, y, z) hold, when “x is (the Gödel code of) a term with the
free variables 〈ν0, · · · , νℓ〉, y is (the Gödel code of) a sequence of
numbers 〈a0, · · · , aℓ〉, and z is the value of the term x when each νi
is substituted with ai”. ✧
LEMMA 2.5 (var, trm, fml∆0 and val are PR)
The relations var, trm, atm, fml∆0 and val are PR.
Proof:
We already noted (in Remark 2.3) that the var relation can even be∆0 (and
so it is a PR relation) by a modest convention on coding. There is also a∆0
relation seq(x)which holds of xwhen x is (the Gödel code of) a sequence.
Let ℓen(x) denote the length of x and [x]i, for each i < ℓen(x), denote
the i-th element of x. Thus, if seq(x) holds, then x codes the sequence
〈[x]0, [x]1, · · · , [x]ℓen(x)−1〉. Let us recall that x 7→ ℓen(x) and (i, x) 7→ [x]i
are both PR functions. Let y=ℓast(x) abbreviate y=[x]ℓen(x)−1.
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• Let trmseq(x) be the following∆0 relation:
seq(x) ∧ ∀i<ℓen(x)
[
[x]i=p0q ∨ [x]i=p1q ∨ var([x]i) ∨
∃j, k<i
(
[x]i=p([x]j+[x]k)q ∨ [x]i= p([x]j×[x]k)q
)]
.
Now, trm(x) can be written as ∃s 6 p(x+1)
2
x trmseq(s) ∧ ℓast(s) = x;
noting that the building sequence of a term x has length at most x and all
the elements of that sequence are non-greater than x. So, trm(x) is PR.
• That atm(x) is a PR relation, follows from the following:
atm(x)≡∃u, v<x
[
trm(u)∧ trm(v)∧
(
x=p(u=v)q∨ x=p(u6v)q
)]
.
•Without loss of generality we can assume that the propositional connec-
tives are only ¬ and → and the only quantifier is ∀. Now, the following
∆0-formula defines the building sequence of a bounded formula:
fml∆0seq(x)≡seq(x) ∧ ∀i<ℓen(x)
[
atm([x]i)∨
∃j, k<i
(
[x]i=p(¬[x]j)q ∨ [x]i=p([x]j→ [x]k)q∨
∃v, t<x
[
var(v) ∧ trm(t) ∧ [x]i=p(∀v6 t)[x]jq
])]
.
So, fml∆0(x)≡∃s6p
(x+1)2
x fml∆0seq(s) ∧ ℓast(s)=x is a PR relation.
• Let valseq(y, s, t) be the following∆0 relation:
seq(y) ∧ termseq(s) ∧ seq(t) ∧ ℓen(t)=ℓen(s) ∧ ∀i<ℓen(s)
[
(
[s]i=p0q ∧ [t]i=0
)
∨
(
[s]i=p1q ∧ [t]i=1
)
∨
(
var([s]i) ∧ [t]i=[y]i
)
∨
∃j, k<i
[(
[s]i=p([s]j+[s]k)q ∧ [t]i=[t]j+[t]k
)
∨(
[s]i=p([s]j×[s]k)q ∧ [t]i=[t]j ·[t]k
)]]
,
which states that y, t are (the Gödel code of) sequences (of numbers) and s
is (the Gödel code of) a building sequence of a term such that t is the result
of substituting the variables of s with the corresponding elements of y.
Finally, val(x, y, z) is PR since it is equivalent with
∃s6p
(x+1)2
x ∃t6p
(z+1)2
z valseq(y, s, t) ∧ ℓast(s)=x ∧ ℓast(t)=z. ❑
REMARK 2.6 (Sat∆0 in the border of PR and ∆0)
The main idea of the proofs of Lemma 2.5 and Theorem 2.7 are from [11,
Chapter 9]. Actually, by the techniques of [8, Chapter V] one can show
that all the relations var(x), trm(x), atm(x), fml∆0(x) and val(x, y, z)
can be ∆0, under a suitable Gödel coding. In Theorem 2.7 we will show
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that Sat∆0(x, y) is a PR relation, which, by Theorem 2.2, cannot be ∆0
under any Gödel coding. We will see in the proof of Theorem 2.7 that
Sat∆0 is definable by the relations var, trm, atm, fml∆0 and val. So,
we have a boundary result here: the PR relations var(x), trm(x), atm(x),
fml∆0(x) and val(x, y, z) all can be ∆0 under some coding, while the PR
relation Sat∆0(x, y) can never be ∆0. ✧
THEOREM 2.7 (Sat∆0 is a PR Relation)
The relation Sat∆0(x, y) is PR.
Proof:
Define the relation sat∆0seq(s, t) by “s is a building sequence of a ∆0-
formula, and t is a sequence of triples 〈i, z, w〉 in which i < ℓen(s) and
w61 is a truth value (1 for truth and 0 for falsity) of the formula [s]i when
the variables v0, v1, · · · are interpreted by [z]0, [z]1, · · · respectively”. Let
z[r/k] denote the sequence resulted from z by substituting its k-th element
with r. The function z, r, k 7→ z[r/k] is PR, and when val(u, z, x) holds,
then we can have val(u, z, x) for some x6pz
u+1
u , since the value of a term
u when its free variables are substituted by the elements of z is non-greater
than pz
u+1
u . The following formula defines the relation sat∆0seq(s, t):
fml∆0seq(s) ∧ seq(t) ∧ ∀l<ℓen(t) ∃i, z, w6 t[
[t]l=〈i, z, w〉 ∧ i<ℓen(s) ∧ w61∧([
∃u, v6s
(
trm(u) ∧ trm(v) ∧ [s]i=p(u=v)q∧
[w = 1↔ ∃x6p
(zu+v+1)2
u+v val(u, z, x) ∧ val(v, z, x)]
)]
∨[
∃u, v6s
(
trm(u) ∧ trm(v) ∧ [s]i=p(u6v)q∧
[w = 1↔ ∃x, y6p
(zu+v+1)2
u+v val(u, z, x) ∧ val(v, z, y) ∧ x6y]
)]
∨[
∃j <i
(
[s]i=p(¬[s]j)q ∧ ∃p<l∃w
′61([t]p=〈j, z, w
′〉 ∧
[w=1↔ w′=0])
)]
∨[
∃j, k<i
(
[s]i=p([s]j → [s]k)q ∧ ∃p, q<l∃w
′, w′′61
([t]p=〈j, z, w
′〉 ∧ [t]q=〈k, z, w
′′〉 ∧ [w=1↔ w′=0 ∨ w′′=1])
)]
∨[
∃j <i∃u, v<s
(
trm(u) ∧ var(v) ∧ [s]i=p(∀v6u)[s]jq ∧ ∃x6p
zu+1
u
[val(u, z, x) ∧ ∀r6x∃p<l∃w′61([t]p=〈j, z[r/pvq], w
′〉)]∧
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[w=1↔ ∀r6x∃p<l∃w′61([t]p=〈j, z[r/pvq], 1〉]
)])]
.
Therefore, sat∆0seq(s, t) is a PR relation, and so is Sat∆0(x, y)which
can be written as ∃s6p(x+1)
2
x ∃t6p2
p
(x+1)2
x ·3p
p
(y+1)2
x
x ·5
x2
[
sat∆0seq(s, t) ∧ ℓast(s)=x ∧ ℓast(t)=〈ℓen(s)−1, y, 1〉
]
.
Let us note that we took ¬,→ as the only propositional connectives
and ∀ as the only quantifier; and we coded 〈i, z, w〉 as 2i · 3z · 5w which
imply the desirable PR bounds as indicated. ❑
3 Representability in Arithmetical Theories
A (most) natural definition for representability of a relation on the natu-
ral numbers in a theory, whose language contains terms n indicating each
natural number n∈N, is the following:
DEFINITION 3.1 (Weak Representability of Relations)
A relationR ⊆ N is weakly representable in a theory T if for some formula
ϕ(x) the equivalence R(n) ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ϕ(n) holds for every n ∈ N. ✧
Though, the following stronger definition is usually used in the litera-
ture on the incompleteness theorem:
DEFINITION 3.2 (Representability of Relations)
A relation R ⊆ N is representable in a theory T if for some formula ϕ(x)
the implications R(n) =⇒ T ⊢ ϕ(n) and ¬R(n) =⇒ T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) hold for
every n ∈ N. ✧
Trivially, representability of a relation in a consistent theory implies its
weaker representability in that theory. The converse does not hold, in the
sense that a relation may be weakly representable in a theory without being
representable (cf. [16, Theorem II.2.16]):
REMARK 3.3 (On the Representability of PROVABILITY)
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Let ProvPA(x) be a provability predicate for Peano Arithmetic PA; then
for every formula ϕ, we have PA ⊢ ϕ if and only if PA ⊢ ProvPA(pϕq),
since ProvPA is a Σ1-formula and PA is Σ1-complete and sound. On the
other hand, there can be no formula Ψ(x) such that for any formula ϕ:
• if ProvPA(pϕq) then PA ⊢ Ψ(pϕq), and
• if ¬ProvPA(pϕq) then PA ⊢ ¬Ψ(pϕq).
Since otherwise provability in PA would be decidable: for a given formula
ϕ by running an exhaustive proof search algorithm in PA for the formulas
Ψ(pϕq) and ¬Ψ(pϕq) in parallel, one could decide if PA ⊢ ϕ (exactly
when PA ⊢ Ψ(pϕq)) or PA 0 ϕ (exactly when PA ⊢ ¬Ψ(pϕq)) holds;
and this is a contradiction (with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem). ✧
For (total) functions we can have four different definitions for repre-
sentability in theories (originated from [19]).
DEFINITION 3.4 (Weakly Representable Functions)
A function f : N → N is weakly representable in a theory T if for some
formula ϕ(x, y) we have
(1) if f(n) = m then T ⊢ ϕ(n,m), and
(2) if f(n) 6= m then T 6⊢ ϕ(n,m),
for every n,m ∈ N. ✧
DEFINITION 3.5 (Representable Functions)
A function f : N → N is representable in a theory T if for some formula
ψ(x, y) we have
(1) if f(n) = m then T ⊢ ψ(n,m), and
(2) if f(n) 6= m then T ⊢ ¬ψ(n,m),
for every n,m ∈ N. ✧
DEFINITION 3.6 (Strongly Representable Functions)
A function f : N → N is strongly representable in a theory T if for some
formula θ(x, y) we have
(1) T ⊢ θ(n, f(n)), and
(2) T ⊢ ∀y, z
(
θ(n, y) ∧ θ(n, z)→ y = z
)
,
for every n ∈ N. ✧
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DEFINITION 3.7 (Provably Total Functions)
A function f : N → N is provably total in a theory T if for some formula
η(x, y) we have
(1) T ⊢ η(n, f(n)), and
(2) T ⊢ ∀x∃y
(
η(x, y) ∧ ∀z
[
η(x, z)→ y = z
])
,
for every n ∈ N. ✧
Indeed these definitions get stronger from top to bottom: If T is con-
sistent and can prove i 6= j for every distinct i, j ∈N, then every provably
total function is strongly representable, and every strongly representable
function is representable, and every representable function is weakly rep-
resentable in T with the same formula. It is a classical folklore that repre-
sentability implies stronger representability (cf. [16, Proposition I.3.3]):
LEMMA 3.8 (Representability =⇒ Strong Representability)
In a theory T which can prove the sentences ∀y(y<n∨ y=n∨ n + 1<y),
∀y(y 6< 0) and ∀y(y < n ↔ y = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ y = n), for all n ∈ N,
representability of a function implies its strong representability.
Proof: If f is representable by the formula ψ(x, y) in T , then let θ(x, y)
be ψ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < y¬ψ(x, z). We now show that T ⊢ θ(n, f(n)) and
T ⊢ θ(n, y) → y = f(n) hold for any n∈N as follows. Reason in T : If
z <f(n) then if f(n)=0 we have a contradiction, otherwise (if f(n) 6=0)
we have z= i for some i<f(n). Of course for any such iwe have¬ψ(n, i);
thus ¬ψ(n, z). If θ(n, y) and y 6= f(n) then either y < f(n) or f(n)< y.
In the former case we have y= i for some i<f(n), if f(n) 6=0, otherwise
y < 0 is a contradiction, and so by ¬ψ(n, i) we have ¬ψ(n, y) which is a
contradiction with θ(n, y). In the latter case by ∀z <y¬ψ(n, z) we should
have ¬ψ(n, f(n)); a contradiction again. ❑
The question if the strong representability implies the provable totality was
mentioned open in the first edition (1964) of the classical book [14]. In
1965, VERENA ESTHER HUBER-DYSON showed that indeed the strong
representability implies the provable totality [4], and as a result this was
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Exercise 3.35 in the second edition (1979) of that book, and Exercise 3.32
in the third edition (1987), attributed to V. H. Dyson. Then in the fourth
(1997), the fifth (2009) and the sixth (2015) editions, this has been proved
in Proposition 3.12, attributed to V. H. Dyson again.
THEOREM 3.9 (Strong Representability =⇒ Provable Totality)
If a function is strongly representable in a theory, then it is provably total
in that theory.
Proof: Let us note that we do not put any condition on the theory T ; let f
be strongly representable by θ in T . Let ∃!uA(u) be an abbreviation for
the formula ∃u
(
A(u) ∧ ∀v[A(v)→ v=u]
)
. Put
η(x, y) =
[
∃!z θ(x, z) ∧ θ(x, y)
]
∨
[
¬∃!z θ(x, z) ∧ y=0
]
.
For any n∈N we have T ⊢ ∃!y θ(n, y); thus from T ⊢ θ(n, f(n)) we get
T ⊢ η(n, f(n)). Now, we show that T ⊢ ∀x∃!y η(x, y). Reason inside
T : If ∃!z θ(x, z), then that unique z which satisfies θ(x, z) also satisfies
η(x, z) and ∀u
[
η(x, u) → u=z
]
, whence ∃!y η(x, y). If ¬∃!z θ(x, z) then
y=0 is the unique y that satisfies η(x, y). ❑
The above proof of Dyson appears also in [10, page 63], [13, Propo-
sition 3.8] and [18, Proposition 9.4.2]. The following theorem (that weak
representability implies representability) is usually proved by showing that
every weakly representable function is recursive and that every recursive
function is (strongly) representable; see e.g. [16, Corollary I.7.8] or [20,
Theorem 4.5]. Here we present a novel and direct proof.
THEOREM 3.10 (Weak Representability =⇒ Representability)
For a theory T , suppose the formula ProofT (z, x) states that “z is (the
Gödel code of) the proof of a formula (with Gödel code) x in T”, and
suppose that T has the following properties:
(i) T ⊢ i 6= j and T ⊢ n 6 m and T ⊢ ∀y(m 6 y → n 6 y), for any
i, j, n,m∈N with i 6=j and n6m;
(ii) T ⊢ ∀y(y6n ∨ n6y) for all n∈N;
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(iii) T ⊢ ∀y(y6n↔
∨ n
i=0 y= i) for all n∈N;
(iv) if T ⊢ φ and k is the Gödel code of this proof then we have that
T ⊢ ProofT (k, pφq);
(v) if k is not the Gödel code of a proof of φ in T then we have that
T ⊢ ¬ProofT (k, pφq), in particular if T 6⊢ σ then T ⊢ ¬ProofT (l, pσq)
for any l∈N.
Then weak representability of a function implies its representability in T .
Proof: Suppose the function f is weakly representable by ϕ in T . For
the (bounded provability) predicate ̺(z, x) = ∃u 6 z ProofT (u, x) let
ψ(x, y) = ∃z
[
̺(z, pϕ(x, y)q)∧∀y′6z [y′ 6=y → ¬̺(z, pϕ(x, y′)q)]
]
. For
showing the representability of f by ψ in T we prove that:
(1) T ⊢ ψ(n, f(n)) for all n∈N, and
(2) T ⊢ ¬ψ(n,m) for all n,m∈N withm 6=f(n).
(1): Fix an n ∈ N and let k ∈ N be a Gödel code for the proof of
T ⊢ ϕ(n, f(n)); so, we have f(n) 6 k. By (iv) above we have
T ⊢ ProofT (k, pϕ(n, f(n))q), and so T ⊢ ̺(k, pϕ(n, f(n))q) by (i)
above. Now, for any i∈N with i 6= f(n) we have that T 6⊢ ϕ(n, i), and so
by (v) above, T ⊢ ¬ProofT (l, pϕ(n, i)q) for any l ∈ N. Thus, by (iii)
above, T ⊢ ¬̺(l, pϕ(n, i)q). Reason in T : for any y′ with y′ 6 k and
y′ 6= f(n), by (iii) above, we have y′= j for some j 6 k with j 6= f(n).
For any such j we have ¬̺(k, pϕ(n, j)q); and so, by (iii) above, the
sentence ∀y′6k [y′ 6=y → ¬̺(k, pϕ(n, y′)q)] holds. Thus, ψ(n, f(n)).
(2): Fix some n,m∈N withm 6=f(n). Let us note that we already have:
¬ψ(x, y)≡∀z
[
̺(z, pϕ(x, y)q)→ ∃y′6z [y′ 6=y ∧ ̺(z, pϕ(x, y′)q)]
]
.
For proving T ⊢ ¬ψ(n,m) we show that
T ⊢ ∀z
[
̺(z, pϕ(n,m)q)→ f(n)6z ∧ f(n) 6=m ∧ ̺(z, pϕ(n, f(n))q)
]
.
Let k∈N be a Gödel code for the proof of T ⊢ ϕ(n, f(n)); so, f(n)6 k.
Also, from T 6⊢ ϕ(n,m), by (v) above, we have T ⊢ ¬̺(l, ϕ(pn,m)q)
for any l ∈ N. Reason in T : for any z, by (ii) above, we have either
(2.i) z6k or (2.ii) k6z. (2.i): If z6k then z = i for some i6k, by (iii)
above. Now, ̺(i, pϕ(n,m)q)→ f(n)6 i∧f(n) 6=m∧̺(i, pϕ(n, f(n))q)
follows from ¬̺(i, pϕ(n,m)q); thus ¬ψ(n,m) holds. (2.ii): If k6 z then
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f(n)6 z, by (i) above, which also implies f(n) 6=m. On the other hand,
we have ProofT (k, pϕ(n, f(n))q) and so ∃u6z ProofT (u, pϕ(n, f(n))q),
or equivalently ̺(z, pϕ(n, f(n))q). Thus, ¬ψ(n,m) holds since we have
f(n)6z ∧ f(n) 6=m ∧ ̺(z, pϕ(n, f(n))q). ❑
Let us note that the (very weak) finitely axiomatizable theory Q, Robin-
son’s Arithmetic, satisfies all the conditions (i) – (v) in Theorem 3.10.
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